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This paper argues that there are ethical issues inherent in information systems (IS) which 
preclude these systems from being managed in a traditional sense of the word. Following the 
critical research tradition, the paper discusses the conventional understanding of management 
as "heroic management". It subsequently analyses some of the more salient ethical issues of IS 
including  access,  privacy,  and  intellectual  property.  One  way  of  addressing  these  ethical 
problems of IS can be found in the concept of responsibility. The discussion of responsibility 
will  show  that  the  typical  understanding  of  the  term,  which  usually  sees  management  as 
directly  responsible  for  the  effects  of  decisions,  is  problematic.  In  order  to  overcome  the 
problems  of  traditional  responsibility  a  concept  of  reflective  responsibility  is  introduced. 
While this idea promises to help overcome the moral and ethical problems of IS, it is grounded 
on participative ideas which in some respects contradict the tenets of heroic management. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of how management should be reconceptualised in order to 
avoid turning into the oxymoron indicated in the title. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information systems (IS) are an integral part of most business organisations. As such they are 
part  of  the  management  structures  of  these  organisations.  Management  is  supposed  to 
generally steer the organisation in a desired direction and make sure that the different parts of 
the organisation work together. Managers within the IS function should help further this goal 
by providing leadership to the effect that the organisation’s strategy is promoted. This is the 
function of CIOs, CKOs, or CTOs. These managers (or leaders) need to understand the overall 
strategy of the organisation as well as their own functional area and ensure that they work for 
the desired goals. In other words: management must take responsibility for the success of IS.  
The present paper will argue that this view of management cannot be upheld. Information   3 
systems  will  be  defined  loosely  as  the  use  of  information  and  communication  technology 
(ICT)  in  organisations.  IS  produce  a  multitude  of  inherent  ethical  problems.  Responsible 
management would have to take these problems into account. The paper will argue that it is 
fundamentally impossible for the individual manager to discharge this responsibility. In order 
to  do  so,  management  must  use  participative  approaches.  This,  however,  goes  against  the 
traditional idea of management. "Responsible management" is thus an oxymoron insofar as the 
term  "responsible"  contains  implications  which  contradict  our  traditional  understanding  of 
management.  
In  order  to  render  this  argument  plausible,  the  paper  will  start  with  a  brief  discussion  of 
management. It will then analyse some of the most salient ethical problems of information 
systems. This will lead to a discussion of the concept of responsibility. The paper will end by 
analysing the question how IS managers can deal with this apparent contradiction. 
This paper can best be classified as a piece of critical research (Chua, 1986; Orlikowski & 
Baroudi,  1991;  Cecez-Kecmanovic,  2001)  using  a  philosophical  /  conceptual  methodology 
(Jenkins,  1985).  Lee  (2001)  suggests  that  authors  using  non-standard  research  approaches 
should spell out the criteria for the evaluation of their work. Klein & Myers (1999) try to do 
this for interpretive research, but a comparable classificatory scheme for critical research in IS 
does not exist. The main aim of the paper is to show the inherent contradiction within the term 
"responsible management". It is thus critical of a use of language and should be considered 
successful  if  it  manages  to  clarify  this  contradiction.  Critical  research  usually  aims  to  be 
emancipatory  (Brooke,  2002;  Hirschheim  &  Klein,  1994;  Varey,  Wood-Harper  &  Wood, 
2002).  For  this  paper  emancipation  means  that  the  people  who  are  affected  by  the 
contradictory understanding of management can overcome the resulting problems. This refers   4 
to employees but more importantly to managers. Finally, as this is a theoretical paper, one 
might look at criteria for good theories (van de Ven, 1989). Weick (1989, 517) suggests that a 
good theory should be "plausible", which means "interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant or 
absurd,  obvious  in  novel  way,  a  source  of  unexpected  connections,  high  in  narrative 
rationality, aesthetically pleasing, or correspondent with presumed realities". The reader may 
judge whether this is the case. 
HEROIC MANAGEMENT  
Since the main argument of the paper is that the ethical problems inherent in IS preclude them 
from being managed in a traditional sense of the word, the first step of the paper should be the 
definition of "management". The verb "to manage" (originally probably derived from the Latin 
manus, the hand) comes from the Italian maneggiare to handle, to be able to use skilfully and 
originally referred to the handling of horses. Today it means "to conduct, carry on, supervise, 
or control" (OED, 2004). In the parlance of business schools and information systems scholars 
or practitioners management refers to a body of knowledge concerning the rational choice of 
means for the purposes of the organisation (Knights & Willmott, 1999). It is closely aligned to 
the idea that there is a strategy that an organisation can and should follow to achieve success 
(Bourlakis & Bourlakis, 2003). The task of management is to shape, optimise and enforce this 
strategy (Knights & Morgan, 1991). 
The individual manager embodies these abstract ideas of management. In order to be able to 
manage,  the  manager  needs  a  number  of  characteristics,  competencies,  and  virtues.  Chief 
among them is a high level of rationality, demonstrated through knowledge of procedures and   5 
methods,  and  usually  confirmed  by  an  academic  degree  (Newell,  Swan  &  Kautz,  2001). 
Because of these characteristics, the manager is often considered a role model and by default 
his  or  her  behaviour  is  considered  morally  correct  (Introna  1997).  The  recent  spate  of 
corporate  scandal  supports  this  contention.  If  managers  were  not  considered  moral  role 
models, then there would be no need to get excited about their misdeeds. The understanding of 
managers is based on the prevalent view of humans in economic and social sciences, namely 
on methodological individualism. Rationality and action is ascribed to the individual manager 
(Hollis, 1994; Hausman & McPherson, 1996; Giddens, 1984).  
Because of the importance ascribed to the individual manager in this view and because of the 
many positive properties the manager is believed to possess, one can call this view "heroic 
management"  (Gosling  &  Mintzberg,  2003).  The  manager  is  a  hero  who  guides  the 
organisation  through  the  dangers  of  economic  reality.  This  heroic  management  view  is 
typically  promoted  in  business  school  and  it  is  usually  reflected  in  information  systems 
research.  The  amount  of  attention  given  to  managers’  views  and  to  the  roles  of  specific 
managers,  for  example  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  (CEO),  the  Chief  Information  Officer 
(CIO), or other managers such as project managers, risk managers, or  others, can best be 
explained through the underlying belief in heroic management.  
Nevertheless, the heroic view of management is not universally accepted. Criticism is levelled 
against it for practical and theoretical reasons (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Willmott, 
2003). The practical critique of heroic management holds that organisational realities do not 
lend themselves to the heroic interpretation of management. One argument is that the factual 
influence managers have on organisational success does not correspond with their heroic role. 
Couillard (1995), for example, argues that project management tools and techniques provide   6 
no significant contribution to project success. Another problem is that being a manager is a 
role an individual plays and that this role can conflict with other roles of the same individual, 
thus  decreasing  the  effectiveness  of  management  (Knights  &  Willmott,  1999).  A  related 
problem is raised by power conflicts within organisations and between managers which again 
preclude them from acting successfully (Introna 1997).  
More  interesting  for  this  paper,  there  is  the  charge  that  managers  are  fundamentally  and 
theoretically  not  capable  of  discharging  their  heroic  role  expectations.  According  to  this 
stream  of  criticism,  heroic  management  is  built  upon  unrealistic  and  contradictory 
assumptions. A phenomenological / existentialist account would see managers as being-in-the-
world in a Heideggerian (1993) sense (Introna 1997; Lawler, 2004). They cannot act in the 
detached and objective manner suggested by the theory of the heroic manager. This is closely 
related to critique of managerial rationality. Scholars following this critique tend to discard the 
idea of methodological individualism and managerial rationality as infeasible and unrealistic. 
The decision science approach to managerial rationality and decision making, according to 
this,  is  simply  wrong.  An  interesting  illustration  of  this  problem  is  the  debate  about 
management fashions, which clearly exist but are hard to reconcile with heroic management 
(Abrahamson,  1996;  Abrahamson  &  Fairchild,  1999;  Kieser,  1997;  Introna  &  Wihittaker, 
2003). Another example of the problems of rationality as supposed by heroic management is 
the role of metaphors and even myth or magic in IS research (Hirschheim & Newman, 1991). 
Instead of being detached optimisers, managers can be described as being emotional (Fineman, 
2001), caught up in uncertainty, power and politics, trying to make sense out of their complex 
environment (Ciborra, 2002). These problems are exacerbated by external developments such 
as globalisation and growing technological complexity (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000; Hanseth &   7 
Braa, 2000). 
This paper intends to contribute to such critical research by showing that the ethical problems 
inherent in information systems render it impossible to manage these systems in a responsible 
way without deviating from the heroic understanding of management.  
ETHICAL ISSUES OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN 
ORGANISATIONS 
The  central  thesis  of  this  paper  is  that  the  organisational  use  of  information  and 
communication  technology  produces  ethical  issues  that  management  cannot  simply  take 
responsibility  for  and  thus  solve.  ICT  is  Janus-faced  (Arnold  2003).  It  has  intrinsically 
contradictory tendencies. An important cause of this contradictory nature of ICT is its moral 
side  and  the  related  ethical  problems.  In  this  section  the  paper  will  develop  the  ethical 
problems of ICT.  
Ethics and morality are terms that refer to the fundamental questions of right and wrong, of 
good and bad. The terms are based on individual as well as collective rights and obligations. 
They try to give an answer to the question: "what should I do?" (Kant 1995, B 805f). In this 
paper  morality  will  be  understood  as  the  set  of  accepted  norms  that  factually  guide  the 
behaviour of members of a certain group. Ethics, on the other hand, is the theory of morality. 
It can be descriptive or normative. This very brief introduction to ethics and morality is not 
philosophically  exhaustive.  For  our  purposes  it  will  suffice  because  it  reflects  the  ethical 
awareness  of  most  IS  practitioners.  (For  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  the  relationship 
between ethics, morality, responsibility, and IS see Stahl (2004).)   8 
Moral Problems of IS 
The following is an overview of some of the most frequently named moral problems produced 
by the use of IS in organisations. It does not claim to be complete or to address all possible 
angles of the issues involved. In order to be able to understand why responsibility might be 
deemed to be a solution to these problems and what the problems of responsibility ascriptions 
are, the following discussion of the moral problems of IS is nevertheless of high importance. 
A central problem that always arises with the introduction of new IS is that of access. For the 
system to work as intended it is of fundamental importance that the right people have access to 
the information they need. At the same time it is necessary to limit access so that information 
cannot be misused. The problem of access has been defined as one of the fundamental ethical 
problems related to IS (Mason 1986). While it is clearly not the only morally relevant area of 
IS, it is among the most relevant ones (Stichler & Hauptman 1998). Who has the power to 
allow access and according to which rules is this power used? This is a question that affects 
the  power  balance  in  an  organisation  and  thereby  touches  on  the  individuals’  rights  and 
obligations.  
On a grander scale the problem of access is often discussed in relation to information overload 
and the digital divide. This divide can be observed within societies (Preece 2002) and between 
countries (Ochoa-Morals 2003). It can be seen as a new problem or the expression of older 
social divides (Moss 2002). Within companies questions of access raise problems of power but 
also issues of free speech and freedom of information and censorship (cf. Siau et al. 2002; 
Weckert & Adeney 1997; Sandy & Darbyshire 2003).  
While access is probably the most basic moral problem of the organisational use of IS because 
it defines the depth and scale of most other problems, privacy and surveillance constitute one   9 
of the most visible problems. The most frequently used definition sees privacy as the "right to 
be let alone" (Warren & Brandeis 1890, 205).  Privacy has been framed in terms of control 
over personal information (Tavani & Moor 2001; Culnan 1993) as the right to informational 
self-determination (Fleming 2003; Stalder 2002) as an aspect of access (Elgesem 2001) or as a 
question  of  property  (Spinello  2000).  Digital  technologies  have  made  it  much  easier  and 
cheaper to generate and transmit data on individuals (Johnson 2001). Data and information, 
once generated, are very hard to contain; as Moor (2000) puts it, technology "greases" the 
data. While technology provides the means for new threats to privacy the motivational drivers 
behind these threats are in many cases business interests (Himanen 2001; Tavani 2000).  
Why  is  privacy  a  moral  good?  There  are  two  types  of  answers  to  this  question.  One 
concentrates on the  effect that a lack of privacy  has on the individual, the other looks at 
organisational  or  social  effects.  Arguments  concerning  the  individual  tend  to  stress  that 
privacy is a necessary condition for the healthy development of a person and its identity. The 
social view points out that these individual problems can create problems for the organisation 
or for society when they destroy the possibility of trusting behaviour (Gallivan. & Depledge 
2003). More generally, relationships with others are more difficult to create without privacy 
(Rachels 1995; Robison 2000; Introna 2000). Another moral problem of privacy is that it is 
closely related to power relationships which again affect individuals’ rights and obligations 
(Rule et al. 1995; Forester & Morrison 1994; Introna 2001; Yoon 1996).  
Surveillance is usually defined as the use of technical means for gathering information on 
someone.  Companies  often  have  good  reasons  to  surveil  their  employees.  Surveillance  of 
employees is often justified as a precautionary measure to avoid economic losses. These losses 
can be caused by non-work related use of ICT (Boncella 2001). The personal use of ICT, also   10 
called "cyberslacking" (Siau et al. 2002; Block 2001) or "cyberslouching" (Urbaczewski & 
Jessup  2002)  supposedly  costs  companies  billions  of  dollars  every  year.  Surveillance  is  a 
moral problems because it reduces privacy and can lead to social exclusion (Lyon 2003) 
Next to privacy and surveillance, the third large topic regarding morality and the use of IS is 
located  in  the  field  of  intellectual  property.  Which  part  of  what  data  belongs  to  the 
organisation, and where are the limits of ownership? What can the company do with its own 
data and how should it organise the storage and processing of data? Individual as well as 
collective rights and obligations may be affected by these questions which renders the issue a 
moral one. As in the case of privacy, this is a complex issue that starts with considerable 
problems at the definition stage. What is intellectual property? Or even: What is property in 
general?  A  useful  starting  point  is  the  definition  of  property  as  a  bundle  of  many  rights 
(Donaldson & Preston 1995). Among them one can find the rights to use, to exclude others 
from  use,  to  dispose  of  or  to  benefit  from  property  (De  George  1999).  Justifications  of 
property typically refer to natural rights or to utility, both of which are moral notions. While 
property in general is a complex moral question, the use of IS and intellectual property raise 
new problems. It is a topic of debate whether and how far property rights are applicable to the 
non-physical entities to which they refer in intellectual property (Barlow 1995).  
Questions  of  quality  of  data  and  programs  look  like  managerial  problems  at  first  sight. 
Managers should make sure that the data that is processed is accurate and that programs run 
according to specifications. However, it is not hard to imagine examples where faulty data or 
programs produce moral problems. A striking example is the correctness of personal data. 
According to Wright & Kakalik (2000) about 50 percent of the FBI’s criminal background files 
are faulty or incomplete. Clearly, this can lead to the infringement of moral rights.    11 
Possibly  even  more  interesting  than  data  quality  are  questions  of  the  quality  of computer 
programs. On the level of a firm they can threaten the very existence of the organisation or 
they can at least cause losses of revenue and profits. These problems are interesting because it 
can be argued that they are inevitable (Littlewood & Stringy 1995). The complexity of modern 
computer  programs  is  such  that  it  is  even  theoretically  impossible  to  test  them 
comprehensively (Collins & Miller 1995). Additionally, there are epistemological problems 
which  arguably  make  it  impossible  to  predict  the  functioning  of  a  computer  program 
exhaustively (Britz 1999). While one can try to minimise these problems by using redundant 
systems, by setting standards of systems development and by testing as far as possible, there 
remains the uncertainty concerning the reliability of programs. 
One should note that these are by far not the only areas where moral problems of IS can arise. 
Another area of high visibility, especially after 9/11, is that of security. How can we assure the 
security of information systems while at the same time leaving them open and available. How 
can we institute security measures without exacerbating some of the other problems such as 
access or introducing new ones such as a hidden racism?  
Apart from such rather obvious issues which are immediately related to managerial activities, 
there are also some "deeper" moral problems of the use of IS. Among them one could find the 
impact IS has on the perception of the other or the tacit change of social structures and power 
relations within and between societies. The fact that we deal with computers in our daily lives, 
possibly more often than with humans, may change the way we perceive and treat humans. 
The metaphor of humans as "meat machines" may make it easier to treat them like machines 
and it may even be a view that it is immoral in itself. Similarly, IS use affects power structures 
within organisations and societies. Buzz words like e-democracy or e-government may hide   12 
morally relevant changes of the way we organise our societies and make democratic decisions 
(Stahl 2001; 2005). Furthermore, there may be moral problems lurking in all sorts of different 
aspects. These will often be specific to a system, a locale, or an organisation and impossible to 
predict from a general point of view. 
Ethical Problems of IS 
Moral problems of the type just outlined are nothing unusual. In fact, the opposite is true. They 
are part of everyone’s day-to-day life and they are deeply embedded in all social activities, 
including life and work in organisations. One should therefore hope that ways to address and 
solve them should be established. This leads us to the academic discipline of ethics and its 
applied sub-disciplines that deal with the issues described here such as information ethics, 
computer ethics, business ethics, etc. Unfortunately, the field of philosophical ethics produces 
a  host  of  new  problems.  During  the  millennia  in  which  philosophers  have  contemplated 
questions of good and evil they have come to a number of different answers that are not 
necessarily compatible. A manager or member of the organisation who is faced with moral 
problems of IS might simply pick and choose one of the traditional approaches and apply it to 
the problems. The range of choice goes from the classic such as virtue ethics or stoicism over 
the modern such as utilitarianism or Kantian deontology to the more recent such as Nozick’s 
libertarianism or differing conceptions of justice such as Rawls’s or Walzer’s.  
The problem is, however, that there is no consensus on which ethical theory is the right or best 
one. What is to do when different theories come to different conclusions? Possible answers 
include  looking  for  something  like  a  universal  morality  (Donaldson  &  Dunfee  1999),   13 
discarding ethical theory for an intuitionist approach (Introna 2002) or some kind of meta-
ethical  approach  that  looks  for  commonalities  of  ethical  theories.  Again,  none  of  these 
approaches seems to be universally convincing and successful. 
We are now at the stage where we see that the moral issues associated with IS have been 
identified as managerial problems. Even if members of the organisation had the theoretical 
knowledge  to  engage  in  a  discourse  about  ethics  it  is  less  than  clear  whether  they  could 
identify an ethical theory that would allow a consensual discussion of the moral matter. This is 
a well-known situation for moral philosophers who find employment because of it but it is not 
very  satisfactory  for  managers  and  business  organisations  who  have  to  come  to  workable 
solutions.  One  concept  that  is  often  associated  with  the  successful  solution  of  business 
problems  as  well  as  normative  problems  of  morality,  ethics,  and  the  law  is  concept  of 
responsibility.  It  could  be  argued  that  management  has  to  take  responsibility  for  the 
technology it deploys, including the ethical problems it raises. 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE SOLUTION? 
Why  can  responsibility  be  seen  as  a  solution  to  our  problem?  First,  responsibility  is  a 
normative concept that can be used to convey moral, ethical, legal or other normative content. 
When I say that I am responsible for my child then this implies all of these aspects. Second, 
responsibility is a well-recognised concept in business organisations where it again implies 
different normative aspects and expectations. Third, responsibility seems to be geared toward 
practical solutions and is not necessarily confined to specific ethical theories. We will thus 
briefly discuss the concept of responsibility, then analyse the problems that it raises and put   14 
forward  a  theory  of  reflective  responsibility  which  combines  the  strengths  of  the  idea, 
overcomes some of its weaknesses, and should allow us to address the ethical problems of IS. 
The Concept of Responsibility 
As all widely-used terms the word "responsibility" is applied in different ways with different 
meanings.  A  straightforward  dictionary  definition  that  would  satisfy  all  of  these  uses  is 
therefore not a viable way of understanding the term. A better way may be a look at the 
etymology  of  the  concept.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  at  the  root  of  responsibility  there  is  the 
response,  the  answer.  Lewis  (1972,  124f)  therefore  concludes  that  it  means  "liability  to 
answer". This same etymological root, the answer, can be found in other languages such as the 
French "responsabilité" (Ricoeur 1990; Etchegoyen 1993) or the German "Verantwortung" 
(Lenk & Maring 1995). Responsibility is thus closely linked to communication.  
The overarching commonality of all of the different uses of the concept is that they describe a 
social construct of ascription (Hart 1948). The term "responsibility" establishes a link between 
an object and a subject. The subject is the entity that is responsible and the object is the fact or 
action that the subject is responsible for. While this describes the essence of responsibility, one 
should note that every single example of responsibility ascriptions involves a host of other 
aspects which can be of high importance. Among those we find additional dimensions (apart 
from subject and object). These can include the authority which determines the success and 
results of the ascription. Other aspects are the type of responsibility (legal, moral, role…), the 
temporal  horizon  (ex  ante  versus  ex  post),  the  normative  background,  etc.  A  complete 
description of any instance of responsibility would have to consider all of these, which is   15 
beyond the confines of this paper.  
There are three aspects that most, if not all, ascriptions of responsibility share. These aspects 
are  openness,  an  affinity  to  action,  and  a  teleological  orientation.  Openness  means  that 
responsibility ascriptions are dynamic social events which need to allow the participation of 
those involved and which are therefore not predictable. Affinity to action describes the fact 
that the very use of the word "responsibility" implies that something will happen (Staddon 
1999).  When  we  hold  someone  responsible  this  means  that  that  person  will  have  to  do 
something, will be rewarded or punished. Finally, there is aspect of teleology. This means that, 
on the one hand, responsibility ascriptions aim to improve life, to get closer to the "good life", 
whatever that means in a particular situation (French 1992). On the other hand, responsibility 
ascriptions are based on consequences, be they manifest and in the past or only expected in the 
future. These three general characteristics will become important later on for the development 
of a sustainable use of the concept.  
Why could this concept seem like a possible solution to the ethical problems of IS? Because its 
formal and communicational nature  allows the  discussion of complex normative questions 
without an a priori definition of their nature as moral, ethical, legal, economic etc. That means 
questions of, say, data protection that might be raised by a system can be addressed from 
different angles simultaneously. Another advantage of responsibility is that it does not require 
an immediate choice of ethical theory. While it could be argued that responsibility is closer to 
some ethical theories such as ethics of communication or consequentialist approaches than 
others  such  as  deontological  or  virtue-based  theories,  this  does  not  necessarily  hold  true. 
During the process of ascription moral problems can be described in terms of different ethical 
theories and there is no fundamental reason why responsibility cannot correspond closely with   16 
duty  (De  George  1999).  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  serious  problems  when  one  tries  to 
ascribe responsibility for the moral side of IS. 
Problems of Responsibility Ascriptions 
Responsibility ascriptions can become problematic for a host of reasons, most of which this 
paper will not be able to cover. When concentrating on the definition of responsibility as an 
ascription of an object to a subject then we can identify all three of the main dimensions of 
responsibility that can cause problems: the subject, the object, and the ascription.  
The subject can cause severe problems. Traditionally, theories of responsibility aimed at the 
natural  person,  the  individual  human  being  as  the  subject.  This  is  problematic  because  it 
implies  that  individuals  have  properties  which  they  may,  in  fact,  lack.  Among  the 
characteristics that define a subject of responsibility one typically finds causality, freedom, 
power,  knowledge  and  personal  qualities.  Disregarding  the  fundamental  philosophical 
problems  these  may  pose,  they  have  relatively  straightforward  meanings  in  responsibility 
ascriptions.  Causality  means  that  the  subject  must  have  a  causal  influence  on  the  object 
(Goldman 1999), that the subject could at least have changed the outcome. Freedom stands for 
the ability of the subject to influence the object according to his or her own fee will (Fischer 
1998). All of the above conditions imply that the subject has knowledge of the object (McGary 
1991) and that it is within his or her power to affect it (Fain 1972). Finally, the subject needs 
personal  properties  such  as  emotions,  a  body,  sensory  perceptions  etc.  to  live  up  to  the 
expectations linked to being a subject. 
When looking at the moral consequences of ICT use in organisations, it quickly becomes clear   17 
that there is nobody who fulfils all of these conditions. Top level management may have the 
power to affect the system but will generally lack the knowledge of the specific problems to do 
so. The people who are aware of some of the moral problems of a system may not have 
complete knowledge of all the different and interlacing problems and they will often not be in 
a position of power to change them. And even where there is someone who can judge the 
different problems and has the power to solve them, that person may not have the freedom in 
the organisation to do so. Briefly, we see the problem that no suitable subject seems to exist to 
address the moral problems of ICT use. 
The second set of problems refers to the object of responsibility. Established examples of 
responsibility such as legal responsibility use the process of ascription to clearly identify the 
object. A criminal usually gets sentenced for a clearly defined deed he committed at a specific 
point in time. The responsibility object in our case presents the problem that it is usually not 
well-defined. The most important reasons for this are uncertainty, complexity, cumulative and 
side effects, and the problem of doing and omitting. Uncertainty enters the picture because 
most of the moral problems of ICT use have to do with future developments and are thus by 
definition not part of our current knowledge. We may estimate that the probability of, say, 
privacy issues arising due to an information system is great, but we don’t know in advance. 
This uncertainty is exacerbated by the complexity of moral questions. As we have seen they 
are indivisibly linked with economic, social, and other questions and they are also linked with 
issues that take place beyond the organisational boundaries. Cumulative effects develop when 
actions that are unproblematic individually produce unwanted results when repeated frequently 
or by many agents. Side effects are unintended results that the agent did not know about or did 
not consider. A cumulative effect is represented in privacy issues. Noting down data about   18 
someone is usually not a problem. However, because it is done so frequently and by so many 
agents, the possibility of negative consequences develops. A side effect of data collection can 
thus be the very moral problem of privacy. In fact, the topic of this entire paper, the moral 
issues of organisational use of IS can be interpreted as a side effect. And finally, there is the 
question whether only actions can count as objects of responsibility or whether omissions 
might play the same role. This raises the difficult problem of what is an action or an omission 
(Birnbacher 1995).  
The last group of problems to be mentioned here refers to the process of ascription itself. In 
order for this to work smoothly, one would have to be aware of all of the dimensions involved 
in the ascription. Among these one can find the above mentioned type of responsibility, the 
authority,  the  normative  background,  the  intended  results  etc.  None  of  these  are  easily 
identifiable and, worse, some of them may be contradictory.  
Responsibility  for  the  moral  effects  of  IS  use  in  organisation  thus  seems  to  be  in  serious 
difficulties. A traditional approach holding management responsible for the unexpected (or 
even expected) and moral consequences of IS use thus seems to be futile. The lone and heroic 
manager is fundamentally incapable of addressing the issues. 
Reflective Responsibility 
A possible solution to the dilemma is to go back to the roots and meaning of responsibility and 
develop an approach from this starting point. It was suggested earlier that responsibility is 
defined by its openness, its affinity to action and its teleology. Reflective responsibility aims to 
check whether a responsibility ascription lives up to these characteristics and, if not, to make   19 
sure that it does.  
In  terms  of  this  paper,  "reflective  responsibility"  stands  for  the  attempt  to  facilitate 
responsibility ascriptions for the moral consequences of IS. In the face of the failings of the 
subject and the complexities of the object this means that we have to ask how it is possible to 
have  responsibility  ascriptions  that  are  open,  lead  to  action,  and  are  teleological.  This  is 
possible by taking into consideration the communicative nature of responsibility.  
In  order  to  overcome  the  problems  discussed  in  the  last  section,  one  should  start  with  a 
bottom-up approach of responsibility and concentrate on the process of ascription rather than 
on the traditional understanding of responsibility as something delegated from top to bottom. 
This means that the process of ascription comprises not only the imputation of sanctions to 
individuals but must be reconceptualised in a broader manner. Briefly, responsibility needs to 
include the problems discussed earlier. That means that the ascription process should include 
the definition of who or what is the subject and the object. The relationship between the two 
must be clarified. It will be part of the ascription to define the underlying telos, the conception 
of the good life underlying the ascription. Furthermore, the normative background, the shared 
understanding of morality and ethical argumentations needs to be clarified. The same goes for 
questions of temporal direction or the depth of side effects to be considered.  
This concept of reflective responsibility is thus a very different idea from what we often think 
of when using the word. In practice it would look more like a Habermasian (1981) discourse 
or  a  realisation  of  stakeholder  participation  (Donaldson  &  Preston  1995).  Reflective 
responsibility thus takes on the form of a stakeholder discourse which defines the dimensions 
of responsibility as well as the particulars of a given ascription. The advantage is that the 
results of such an ascription will include the factual and normative knowledge of all of the   20 
participants. The discourse, if it leads to a consensus or a compromise, should thus be able to 
define  responsibilities  that  are  viable  and  realistic.  Moral  problems  of  IS  use  should  be 
identified early on and solutions can be found that meet the problem. Responsibility can be 
ascribed  to  individuals  as  well  as  collectives,  depending  on  their  ability  to  live up  to  the 
ascriptions. 
This  sort  of  approach  also  has  considerable  disadvantages.  A  stakeholder  discourse  is 
theoretically and practically difficult to realise. How can distortions and power imbalances 
between participants be avoided or overcome? Then there are organisational problems. Who 
starts the discourse of ascription, and why do they do it (Heng & de Moor 2003)? How is 
fairness in the choice of topic guaranteed? There is no guarantee that the discourse will result 
in success. It may be that the life-worlds of the participants diverge too much for them to 
agree. Despite these disadvantages, reflective responsibility is useful because it is a valid and 
legitimate way of realising responsibility ascriptions and thus addressing the ethical issues of 
IS. Refraining from choosing this method will mean not ascribing responsibility for IS. This 
choice may at least partly explain the high percentage of systems failure. 
What would this concept of reflective responsibility look like in practice? Responsibility for 
moral problems of an IS would be ascribed by the affected participants. Let us assume that a 
privacy issue of customers due to data collection in the system is the problem. This problem 
would  have  to  be  raised  and  the  stakeholders  would  need  to  be  identified.  These  would 
presumably  include  the  data  workers  who  enter  the  data,  managers  of  these  workers,  the 
people who provided the specifications, the customers, and possibly others. These affected 
parties need to collectively define responsibility. That means they would have to agree on 
what exactly is seen as the problem, why it is a problem, how it could be addressed, who   21 
should address it and how, and what the consequences of this ascription are. Results of this 
might be an opt-in scheme that management would have to initiate, it could be anonymising 
the data, or any number of other measures. The sanctions for actions should be defined clearly 
and the desired outcome should be specified. If this is the case then the reflective idea of 
responsibility stands a good chance of being able to tackle the problems brought about by the 
moral consequences of IS use in organisations.  
RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT OF IS - AN OXYMORON? 
This paper has argued that ethical and moral problems are inherent to the use of IS. A classical 
"tool" for addressing such normative problems is the concept of responsibility. However, a 
closer look at responsibility showed that the classical understanding of responsibility, typically 
managerial  responsibility,  would  not  be  able  to  overcome  the  problems  due  to  inherent 
limitations including power, knowledge, freedom, or causality. In order to overcome these 
limitations a concept of reflective responsibility was put forward that is supposed to address 
the very problems of responsibility in the process of responsibility ascriptions. The resulting 
process can be characterised as a stakeholder discourse which can plausibly be argued to be 
able to address the shortcomings of traditional responsibility. 
This leaves us with a contradiction, the oxymoron indicated in the title. In order to be able to 
address the ethical problems of IS, managers have to assume responsibility. However, this now 
means  they  have  to  give  up  power  and  control.  For  fundamental  ontological  and 
epistemological reasons, responsibility ascriptions only stand a chance of being successful if 
they  are  the  result  of  a  bottom-up  participative  process.  While  managers  are  important   22 
stakeholders in this process, they are not the only ones and they do not have the power to force 
their  solutions  onto  the  rest  of  the  stakeholders.  Responsible  management  of  IS  therefore 
cannot be the type of heroic management discussed earlier.  
How can managers deal with this contradiction? Given the inevitability of ethical problems of 
IS  and  the  necessity  of  taking  or  assuming  responsibility  for  the  systems  and  their 
consequences, the solution will have to be a reconceptualisation of management. Managers 
need to see themselves as facilitators and overseers of discourses, not as strong leaders. The 
heroic view of management, which emphasises the contribution of the individual manager is 
simply not suitable for the complexities of moral issues in IS. For managers and business 
academics, this may not be an attractive solution. It questions some of the most cherished 
ideas of business and throws doubt on the traditional role of management. Thought through to 
the end, this view of managerial responsibility will also raise doubts about the social status of 
managers including their remuneration.  
Since this paper aims to be critical, the concluding question should be: what is the critical 
contribution,  where  does  the  paper  overcome  structural  problems  of  capitalism  or  help 
emancipate labourers? The contribution of the paper is on the conceptual level. By showing 
the intrinsic contradiction between the ethical problems of IS and what was termed "heroic 
management", the paper pointed out a fundamental problem in the basis of capitalism. At the 
same  time  it  also  showed  a  way  forward,  namely  the  concept  of  reflective  responsibility. 
Reflective responsibility allows the successful ascription of responsibility for complex issues 
like  the  ethics  of  IS  without  falling  into  the  trap  of  other  participative  approaches  (cf. 
Howcroft & Wilson, 2003). By basing the approach on participation, reflective responsibility 
is fundamentally emancipatory in nature. It emancipates the participating employees by giving   23 
them a chance of defining responsibility relationships and by offering the opportunity to voice 
their view. Simultaneously, it has an emancipatory effect on management by indicating the 
limits of heroic management. In this paradigm, managers no longer need to be the towering 
figures who can right all problems. Instead, they acquire the more realistic task of guiding 
stakeholder discourses to a generally acceptable end. This is possible but it requires a critical 
restatement of the role of management.  
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